We examine some of the most basic devices that major central banks in Asia and the Pacific use to communicate with markets. First, we consider gradualism and reversal aversion in the setting of policy rates and argue that these patterns of behavior help market participants form expectations of future policy rates. Second, we analyse the statements released at the time of policy decisions and suggest that it is not so much the length of the statement that matters but the extent to which it focuses on forward-looking information. We then propose two tests for the effectiveness of central bank communication. The first is a version of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates, which is a joint test of the effectiveness of communication and the informational efficiency of the domestic fixed-income market. The second is a surprises test, which compares the reaction of longer term interest rates to policy announcements with the reaction to macroeconomic news.
Introduction
In economies where financial markets play a significant role, expectations of market participants are naturally a significant channel for monetary policy. Indeed it is because such markets are forward-looking and expectations so important that the issues of transparency and communication come to the fore. As Svensson (2004) put it, "monetary policy is to a large extent the management of expectations."
In Asia and the Pacific, many central banks have chosen as their operating target an overnight interest rate, one Blinder (1998) has characterised as "an interest rate that is relevant to virtually no economically interesting transactions." This policy rate must somehow be connected to the interest rates that do matter, and the connection would often involve expectations about future policy rates. If such expectations were reflected in an effective yield curve, then the conduct of monetary policy would essentially be about managing market expectations so as to shape that yield curve.
In this paper, we argue that central banks in Asia and the Pacific have been learning to conduct monetary policy so as to take advantage of the market expectations channel. Their efforts to manage market expectations have led to certain patterns of behavior that seem to help market participants devise useful heuristics to form expectations about monetary policy.
These patterns of behavior include gradualism and reversal aversion in setting policy rates.
The central banks also now tend to release policy statements that vary widely in length across central banks but that are also somewhat shorter and contain somewhat more forward-looking information than before.
We propose two tests for the effectiveness of central bank communication in managing market expectations. The first is a version of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates, which is a joint test of the effectiveness of communication and the informational efficiency of the domestic fixed-income market. The second is a surprises test, which compares the reaction of longer term interest rates to policy announcements with the reaction to macroeconomic news.
In what follows, we first briefly review the literature on monetary policy as management of market expectations. We then examine in section 3 how central banks in the region seem to manage expectations in the way they adjust their operating targets. In section 4, we analyse the management of expectations through the statements that central banks typically release at the time of policy rate decisions. In section 5, we provide a preliminary investigation of the impact on markets of such management of expectations.
2.
Monetary policy as management of market expectations
Channels of monetary policy and interest rates that matter
In the macroeconomics literature, the channel of choice for monetary policy initially focused on the money channel. In the 1960s, Patinkin (1965) and Friedman (1968) thought of the money channel in terms of a real balance effect and liquidity effect as the driving factors in the transmission mechanism. In the 1970s, Lucas (1972) and Sargent and Wallace (1975) introduced the notion of rational expectations even while continuing to assume that the transmission mechanism depended largely on the money channel.
It was in the 1990s that Taylor (1993) specified monetary policy rules in which the transmission mechanism worked mainly through interest rates. Also during this period, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) emphasized the credit channel, in which a risk premium for external finance played an important role. In the latter part of the 1990s, economists began to see monetary policy as working mainly through the expectations channel, although in the theoretical literature the object of expectations was inflation rather than interest rates. To Woodford (2005) , for example, expectations matter and little else does. As Svensson (2005) put it, "monetary policy is to a large extent the management of expectations".
What exactly are the expectations to be managed? The theoretical literature has continued to emphasize inflationary expectations, and standard macroeconomic models continue to assume that the central bank already controls "the" interest rate. In practice, however, there are many interest rates and the one the central bank controls is not necessarily the one that has the greatest influence on real activity. In the recent empirical literature and in contrast to the theoretical literature, tests of transparency do tend to focus on interest rates as the object of expectations and thus implicitly rely on the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates. Kohn and Sack (2003) , for example, look at movements in such interest rates to see whether "central bank talk" matters. Similarly, Fracasso, Genberg and Wyplosz (2003) measure surprises in terms of movements in one-month, three-month and 12-month interest rates to evaluate the quality of inflation reports.
In Asia and the Pacific, central banks have increasingly chosen an overnight or one-day interest rate as the operating objective of monetary policy. The common use of an overnight or one-day interest rate as the operating target by central banks in the region was not always the case. Until 2004, the Bank Negara Malaysia still used a "three-month CB intervention rate" as its policy rate, and until 2006, the Bank of Thailand relied on the 14-day repo rate. There are also reports that Bank Indonesia will soon switch to an overnight interest rate for its operating target.
The interest rate targets identified above are seldom the rates that drive consumption or investment decisions in the economy at large. As emphasized by Shin (2008) , short-term interbank rates are important because they reflect liquidity in the banking system, and the functioning of the whole financial system may depend on such liquidity. Nonetheless, for as long as the system functions well, the central bank will want to influence longer term interest rates for purposes of monetary policy. Table 2 lists for each of 12 economies the interest rates that evidently matter, that is, the interest rates that serve as a basis for pricing residential mortgages, bank business loans and medium or long-term financing. Bank loans extended to businesses tend to be priced in reference to interbank rates with a wide range of maturities but typically a 3-month rate. Residential mortgages come in two basic forms, variable-rate and fixed-rate. The variable rates appear to be commonly linked to short-term interbank rates and the fixed-rates to swap yields. Medium-term and long-term financing is typically available in maturities ranging from one year to five years and in some cases up to 10 years, with interest rates linked to yields taken from either a swaps curve or a government bond curve. 
Expectations and the yield curve
To influence the interest rates that matter, central banks must somehow rely on market expectations. These expectations would determine the yield curve, which then provides the reference points for the interest rates do that matter. and Kahneman (1974) have shown that "people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors." Gabaix and Laibson (2000) have modeled such heuristics in terms of proxy value functions. In market economies, yield curves are likely to play important roles in the heuristics about future interest rates.
We argue in this paper that in general experience teaches central banks to understand this behavior in markets, so that they will try to conduct monetary policy in ways that allow for heuristics that will not lead market participants to serious errors in judgment. In marketoriented economies, these heuristics often place the yield curve at center stage, and monetary policy becomes effective to the extent that the authorities can influence the shape of this curve.
Managing expectations by deeds: gradualism and reversal aversion
In this section, we analyze two important features of the conduct of monetary policy by central banks in Asia and the Pacific: (a) the size of policy rate adjustments; and (b) how often they make consecutive policy changes in the same direction. The first feature we call gradualism, the second reversal aversion. Together these two devices seem to lead to heuristics that simplify the way market participants think about monetary policy and allow the central bank to more effectively manage market expectations and influence the yield curve.
Gradualism
Not only have central banks in Asia and the Pacific chosen as their target policy rates "interest rates that do not matter", they have also increasingly been adjusting these policy rates in increments so small that Willem Buiter once characterized the changes as "chicken The People's Bank of China has tended to move its one-year benchmark lending and deposit rates by 18 or 27 basis points. For purposes of this analysis, we "round off" 27 basis points to 25 basis points.
There is a slight asymmetry in the way central banks make these adjustments in policy rates.
It does matter whether the central banks are reducing policy rates or raising them. As shown in Table 3 , 77 out of 98 policy rate hikes were by 25 basis points, while only 52 of 92 rate declines were by 25 basis points. In 2007, there were 14 hikes in policy rates and 14
reductions. All the hikes were by 25 basis points or less, while three of the reductions were by 50 basis points or more. In other words, central banks are a bit more likely to make a relatively large move when they are easing monetary policy than when they are tightening.
Some central banks have been more likely to make small policy rate moves than others. As shown in Table 4 for which 86% of moves were by 25 basis points.
Reversal aversion
While central banks in the Asia-Pacific region make only small changes in their policy rates, they also make several of them consecutively in the same direction. This tendency to make several adjustments in the same direction is what we call "reversal aversion". Hence, over time, these gradual moves would cumulate to more than "chicken feed". More importantly, once such monetary policy behavior is established, a single small policy rate move could telegraph further such moves in the future and generate a significant shift in the yield curve.
During the 2000-2007 period, the ten central banks in the region that have chosen interest rates as their operating objectives showed a rather strong tendency to move those rates in the same direction as the last move. As shown in Table 5 , 87% of all the policy rate moves were moves in the same direction as the previous one. This tendency was strongest for the Reserve Bank of India, which followed a policy rate move by one in the same direction 90% of the time. In most cases, the frequency was at least 86%. There are only two exceptions here. One is the Bank of Korea, which made consecutive moves in the same direction only 76% of time. The other is the Bank of Japan, which did so only 50% of the time, albeit out of only a total of only five policy rate moves during the period.
The pattern of reversal aversion seems roughly symmetric with respect to rate increases and rate decreases. As shown in Table 6 , on average, 87% of policy rate increases were followed by another rate increase and 86% of policy rate declines by another rate decline. Among the central banks that made at least 20 policy rate moves during the period, the most pronounced asymmetries were those of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. In the case of the former 90% of rate increases were followed by another rate increase, while only 75% of rate decreases were followed by a rate decrease. In the case of the latter, it was 90% for rate increases and 75% for rate decreases.
The "cat's tail" heuristic
All in all, the way in which central banks in Asia and the Pacific conduct monetary policy seems to have become gradual and reversal averse. This behaviour is sometimes described as "interest-rate smoothing" and is often justified as a way to avoid undue volatility in interest rates. Sack and Wieland (2000) show that such smoothing is optimal in the face of forwardlooking behaviour by market participants and uncertainty regarding structural parameters.
Rudebusch (2002) Meulendyke (1989) , every day after 11:30 a.m., the "desk" of the New York Fed would notify primary dealers of the amount of repo transactions it would like to do and whether the transactions were for foreign official customers or the Federal Reserve system. The code words then were "customer" versus "system", where the former had no implications for monetary stance while the latter did. With the advent of policy announcements, the code words have changed to such terms such as "upside risks" and "downside risks".
Conversations with market participants suggest one possible heuristic that is now used to assess monetary policy in the context of gradualism and reversal aversion. According to this heuristic, central banks move policy rates as if they were trying to cut a cat's tail. They don't know how much to cut and so they cut a little at a time. For market participants, this heuristic seems to simplify enormously the complex task of assessing the likelihoods of the many different paths the policy rate could take. Note that gradualism here is not the same as interest rate smoothing. Gradualism reflects the central bank's own uncertainty about how much to ease or tighten rather than simply an effort to avoid volatility. The small size of the policy rate moves is a measure of the uncertainty confronting the central bank. This may be one reason the rate declines have a slight tendency to be larger than rate increases: there tends to be less uncertainty about an economy that needs more stimulus than one that needs to be dampened.
Managing expectations by words: an analysis of monetary policy statements
We to the operating target would help to communicate on the last broad issue, the outlook for policy, but communicating the other three would likely require the use of words.
To communicate by words, central bank officials may give speeches, press conference may be held to explain recent policy decisions and minutes of monetary policy committee meetings may be released to the public. One thing that all central banks seem to do these days is to issue a monetary policy statement to accompany a policy rate decision.
Releasing a policy statement is such a standard practice these days that we often forget that The most recent to join the club has been Bank Indonesia, which issued its first monetary policy statement in July 2005.
A monetary policy statement is typically released soon after a monetary policy meeting.
Hence, the frequency of statement releases depends on the frequency of meetings. As shown in Table 7 , this varies from as much as twice a month in the case of the Bank of Japan to eight times a year in the case of Bank Negara Malaysia and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The Reserve Bank of Australia was an exception in this regard. It released a statement every quarter and whenever a change was made in the target cash rate. Until recently, no statement was released when no policy rate change was made. This has now changed, with the bank now releasing a statement after every meeting even when there is no change in the policy rate.
The nature of the statement that is released varies widely across the region and in each case has evolved over time. In the rest of this section, we dig more deeply into the nature of these statements by focusing on their length and on their forward-looking content.
How long are monetary policy statements?
It is tempting to think that increased transparency in monetary policy would be associated with longer monetary policy statements. After all, the more central banks try to explain, the more market participants would understand monetary policy. In fact, however, once central banks started to publish policy statements, there seems to have been no clear trend to try to "explain more" when we measure "explaining more" in terms of the number of words in a The data show that the length of monetary policy statements has varied widely across central banks and in some cases has evolved over time. As shown in To the extent that there is a trend in the length of monetary policy statements, it seems to have been towards shorter statements. The word counts for the Bank of Japan, Bank of Korea and Bank of Thailand in earlier periods were significantly higher than they are at present. In the case of the Reserve Bank of Australia, the recent publication of the 332-word "Statement by Glenn Stevens, Governor: Monetary Policy" seems to be consistent with this trend. The monetary policy committee of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas now meets only every six weeks instead of every month but its policy statement has not gotten longer, implying a total yearly word count that is now lower than before.
Is a trend towards shorter statements an indication of less transparency? When one looks deeper into the content of monetary policy statements, the number of words does not seem to be a good measure of transparency. According to Fernández (2007) , the relation between the length of monetary policy statements and their information content is rather weak in Asia and the Pacific. In other words, the transparency of central banks -at least when narrowly measured in terms of the forward-looking content of monetary policy statements --is independent of the length of statements.
How forward-looking are monetary policy statements?
To better understand the use by central banks of monetary policy statements to communicate with the markets, we look at the information content in those statements. In fact, such statements are often written so that they maintain a certain structure (e.g, a discussion of the domestic growth followed by one on the global economy), so that market participants can skip to the specific section of interest. Even the shortest of all statements, the FOMC statement, is seldom read in its entirety, and typically only one or two sentences will change from one statement to the next. To market participants, the most important information in these statements seems to be the outlook for future policy. Hence, in this section, we focus on the forward-looking content of the statements. According to this scoring system, the statements released by the US Federal Open Market
Committee are the gold standard in terms of forward-looking information. As shown in Malaysia also seem to put more emphasis on backward-looking rather than forward-looking information.
There 
Effectiveness of communication policy
How well have central banks communicated with market participants in fostering a market expectations channel? In this section, we propose two tests and report very preliminary results for central banks in the region. One is a test of the expectations hypothesis, which is a test on whether yield curves reflect expectations of future policy rates. The other is a surprises test, which is a test of whether policy rate decisions and the statement released on the same day catch market participants by surprise to a greater extent than do macroeconomic data releases. Needless to say, the reliability of either test will depend on how liquid and developed the domestic fixed-income markets are.
How well do yield curves predict policy rates?
Our test of the expectations hypothesis is a joint test of how well the central bank has communicated its strategy and policy outlook and of the informational efficiency of the markets. To test the expectations hypothesis for US interest rates, Shiller et al (1983) (2002)) suggest that the importance of a term premium would in fact lead to a coefficient that is less than unity even when the yield curve properly reflects expectations of future short rates.
For the present analysis, we run the Shiller et al regressions using as short rates the policy rates of central banks in the region. These central banks include the Reserve Bank of Australia, Bank Indonesia, Bank of Korea, Bank Negara Malaysia, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and Bank of Thailand. We conduct the analysis for horizons and maturities ranging from six months to 10 years.
Our analysis suggests that in varying degrees yield curves in five of the economies we consider reflect expectations of future policy rates. Graph 4 shows the estimated coefficients for the cases in which the estimates are statistically significant. Consistent with previous results for the United States and Europe, the estimated coefficients are all less than unity, reflecting the importance of term premia. The regressions show that even in the presence of term premia yield curves in Australia and New Zealand contain significant information about future policy rates at a wide range of horizons but especially at the five-year and 10-year horizons. Korea's yield curve predicts the policy rate at the six month horizon, Thailand's curve at the two-year and three-year horizons and the Philippines' curve at the five-year horizon. These results suggest that at least for these five countries, there is potentially an expectations channel operating through the yield curve.
A surprises test: policy rate decisions versus macroeconomic news
In their evaluation of inflation reports by inflation-targeting central banks, Fracasso, Genberg and Wyplosz (2003) propose a surprises test. They measure surprises in terms of the size of the responses of one-month, three-month and 12-month interest rates to policy rate decisions. They then find that in a cross-section of inflation-targeting economies, the surprise measure tends to be inversely correlated with the quality of the inflation report. In this paper, we employ a similar idea by measuring surprises in terms of movements in interest rates in reaction to information events. Instead of comparing surprises across countries, however, we compare surprises arising from policy rate decisions with those arising from the arrival of macroeconomic news.
A central bank that communicates effectively would find its policy rate decisions as well as its statement about the policy outlook to be well anticipated by market participants. In other words, if the central bank has already explained well its reaction function, that is, it has communicated fully the strategy that guides policy decisions in general (Woodford's (2005b) broad issue (c), then communicating the policy outlook becomes redundant. Any such information would already be incorporated in the longer maturities of the yield curve and the policy announcement would no longer contain a surprise to move yields. On the other hand, the arrival of macroeconomic news would convey new information to both the central bank and market participants, and the latter would then try to infer the implications of the news for In the case of the United States, policy rate announcements by the FOMC since 1994 have typically been well anticipated by market participants and have thus caused relatively little movement in the yield curve beyond the short end. By contrast, macroeconomic announcements, such as those of the non-farm payroll number, PPI and CPI, cause relatively large movements in the yield curve. Fleming and Remolona (1999a) , for example, use tick-by-tick data for the five-year on-the-run US Treasury note and find that most of the price impact happens within five minutes of an announcement. At this frequency, they find that the average price impact of a non-farm payroll announcement is about five times that of a Fed funds target rate announcement. Indeed they find that five other announcements -the PPI, 10-year note auction results, 30-year bond auction results, CPI and new home salesexert a stronger impact on the market than does the FOMC announcement. More recent estimates by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b) suggest that the pattern has remained largely the same. For Asia and the Pacific, we obtain data from Bloomberg on yields for various maturities and the dates of policy decisions and macroeconomic releases. The yield data we have been able to obtain consist only of data at the daily frequency. This means our results would often be clouded by other developments that take place on the day of the announcements we look at. In the absence of higher frequency data, these results will necessarily be very preliminary.
Moreover, the fixed-income markets in the region tend to be less liquid than the US market, making market reactions more difficult to detect. In the regressions we report below, we use dummy variables for event dates, in which the events include the dates of policy decisions and statements and the dates of macroeconomic data releases.
For five of the markets in the region, we find a significant impact on one-year and two-year yields by either the policy announcement or the CPI announcement. These markets are those of Australia, Japan, Korea, New Zealand and Thailand. The fact that we find significant effects in these markets is partly a function of the fact that these markets are also among the more liquid ones in the region. No other domestic macroeconomic announcement is detected to be important in these markets while in some cases the US non-farm payroll has a significant impact.
The policy rate announcement has a significant impact in four of the markets and the CPI in three. As shown in Graph 5, the policy rate announcement seems to move markets in Australia, Japan, Korea and New Zealand, while the CPI seems to do so in Australia, Korea and Thailand. These results places the Bank of Thailand at one extreme, suggesting that the central bank has been so effective in communication that its policy rate decisions are well anticipated even while CPI announcements tend to contain big surprises. By this measure, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand appears somewhat less effective, its policy announcements appearing to contain a larger element of surprise than do CPI announcements. Similarly, albeit to a lesser degree, the Bank of Korea's policy announcements seem to bring more surprises than the CPI news. In the case of the Reserve Bank of Australia, the element of surprise appears to roughly the same between policy announcements and CPI announcements. It is important to note that these results are based only on daily data, and estimates based higher frequency data may alter these conclusions.
Conclusions
In this paper, we argue that central banks in 
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